|
Page 6 of 9
25th Marines
D-day, 19 February, 1945.
The first wave, composed of LVT(A)(4)s landed at 0902 and moved inland to the base of the first terrace. The LVT(A)(4)s on the right flank moved to the right of the beach and in the water to cover the debarkation of troops in the later waves. The second waves (first wave of troops) landed at 0904 and disembarked troops about 20 yards inland. The first and second waves reported that there was only light enemy fire until the troops disembarked and moved approximately 25 yards from the LVT, when they came under very heavy MG, mortar, artillery and rocket fire. BLT-1/25 on the left although at least 200 yards south of its proper position had no contact with the unit on its left and extended to the left to make this contact. At 0932, BLT-1/25 reported that troops were still under heavy fire of all types but had moved inland 300 yards. At 1007, BLT-3/25 reported that troops had moved north along the beach 350 yards and that its left flank was inland 400 yards and in contact with BLT-1/25. BLT-3/25 also reported receiving very heavy and accurate small arms fire from the cliff line in 183-V-W-X. At 0945, an armored bulldozer and a section of Co Hq of Co A, 4th Engr Bn was sent to the left of Beach BLUE 1 to prepare a roadway off the beach for the tanks. This bulldozer was actually landed on Beach RED 2, a distance of 1000 yards to the left (south) of Beach BLUE 1, and did not reach Beach BLUE 1 until the following day. At 1017, the tanks had landed and were moving inland from Beach BLUE 1. Co B, 4th Tank Bn, less one platoon was attached to Co A. As the three LSMs carrying the tanks approached the beach they drew heavy artillery and mortar fire. Although this fire did not prevent the landing of the LSMs it did slow the launching of the tanks. All three LSMs were hit by enemy fire but were able to launch all tanks and retract from the beach. At 1025, BLT-3/25 reported its lines approximately on the RCT )-a line on the right flank and within 150 yards of the beach in 183-V. BLT-3/25 further reported that casualties had been very heavy and that its companies were considerably disorganized due to the heavy casualties and the fact that some of the waves had landed on beaches to the left (south) of its assigned areas of Beach BLUE 1. At 1022, BLT-1/25 reported that its lines were 400 yards inland, that there was a gap of approximately 100 yards on the right flank, that a portion of the Res Co had been committed, that heavy casualties had been received, particularly to key personnel, that heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was still being received along the whole front and on the beach. at 1130, BLT-1/25 had nearly reached a line abreast of the airfield.
By 1200, it was seen that it was vital for RCT-25 to seize the high ground to the NE of its Beach (TA 183-V-W). In view of the gap that had developed between BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 the C.O. of BLT-2/25 (RCT Res) on board the BLUE control boat (PC 1081) was ordered to land his BLT on Beach BLUE 1, attack in a column of companies astride the boundary between BLT 1/25 and BLT-3/25. Permission to use the second Co was given to the C.O. BLT-2/25 but the remaining Co was not to be employed without approval from the RCT Comdr. By 1400, BLT-2/25 had moved one company into the line between BLT-1/25 and BLT-3/25 and a coordinated attack was started. At 1530 F and G Co of BLT-2/25 were passed through E Co and the attack continued. It was requested by the C.O. RCT-25 that artillery be landed and at 1545 one battery of 1/14 had been dispatched from the line of departure with the other batteries to follow at appropriate intervals. 1/14 was in position and ready to for fire missions by 1700. at 1632, BLT-1/24 started landing on Beach BLUE 1 and became attached to RCT-25 upon landing but with the provision that it would not be employed without authority from Div. An Assembly Area in TA 165-E, 166-A was designated by the RCT-25 Comdr. At this time BLT-2/25 was given authority to commit its companies without prior approval of the RCT Comdr. At 1730, the heavy casualties and disorganization of BLT-3/25 were such that the RCT Comdr requested and received permission to use one Co of BLT-2/24. By 1830 the high ground on top and inland of the quarry had been seized by BLT-2/25 and BLT-3/25, but extremely heavy casualties had been received. Co A of BLT-1/24 was attached to BLT-3/25 at 1845. At 1900, BLT-3/25 reported its front line strength as being only 150 men and in view of the counter-attack expected on the right flank, permission was requested from Div to use one Co of BLT-3/24 (Div Res) which was in position immediately to the rear of BLT-3/25. This request was denied but permission to use one more Co of BLT-1/24 was ranted and Co B of BLT-1/24 was attached to BLT-3/25. Units commenced digging in at 1700 and firm contact was established along the RCT front except on the left flank where there was a gap of 75 yards. This gap was covered by fire and observation during the night. By 2330, A and B Co of BLT-3/25 had been pulled out, and had taken up a secondary defensive line in rear of BLT-1/24.
The total area occupied by RCT-25 was under continuous artillery, mortar and rocket fire from shortly after the landing of the initial waves until well after dark. Evacuation of casualties and bringing in of supplies was exceedingly difficult, for when any boat approached the beach, it was immediately subject to accurate mortar and artillery fire. The effectiveness of the Shore Party was consequently greatly reduced and no roads for wheeled vehicles could be constructed. It was not until well after dark that any re-supply of front line units could be effected and this was done only by use of balanced loaded LVT(4)s running directly to the front line units.
The advance RCT CP was established ashore at TA 165-J at 1530 by the RCT Executive Officer and the RCT Comdr moved ashore at 1700. For the final line for the night, See Appendix I to Section 4 (Progress of the Attack Overlay).
|
