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23rd Marines - DOG PLUS NINE, 28 FEBRUARY, 1945

Intermittent concentrations of light and heavy mortar fire fell on the front line positions and rear areas during the night. At 0043, enemy cargo parachutes were reported to be falling along the front of the RCT's lines, some 400 to 600 yards into enemy territory. No alert had been received. This area was thoroughly pounded by artillery, to destroy any cargo, or enemy personnel trying to recover them. No evidence of the effectiveness of this shelling was found, but the intensity of the fire was such that the greater bulk of any such cargo must have been destroyed. At 2400, Division Operation Order 9-45 for the continuation of the attack was received, and at approximately 0300 RCT Operation Order 7-45 was issued to all units. RCT 23 continued the attack after an artillery, naval gunfire and air preparation from King minus forty-five to King-Hour. 2/14 remained in direct support of RCT 23. BLT 2/23 with attachments of Co E, BLT 2/24, and the 2d Section, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, executed a relief of 3/23 on the line at 0600, and resumed control of George Company, 2/23. 3/23 upon being relieved, passed to RCT Reserve, and continued mopping-up operations in the rear of the RCT zone. One Platoon of Company B, 4th Tk Bn, was assigned to support the attack, with the remainder of the company assembled prepared to execute missions on order. Because of the changing direction of attack, the boundary between assault BLTs had been slightly adjusted, reassigning HILL 382 to the zone of the left BLT, instead of the right BLT as on the previous day. At 0815, BLTs 2/23 and 1/23 abreast, 2/23 on the right, jumped off in the attack, meeting comparatively light resistance initially. BLT 2/23 on the right advanced about 200 yards before being stopped by increasing mortar fire and the cross-fire from mutually supporting automatic weapons in concealed bunkers and pillboxes. On the left, in 1/23 zone, resistance was encountered from mortars falling around HILL 382, and also from automatic weapons fire from the left front and the western slopes of 382. At 1300, after a ten minute artillery preparation, a coordinated attack was launched in conjunction with RCT 21 on the left which netted a ground gain of approximately 300 yards in left of BLT 1/23 zone of action. At 1415, Co A, BLT 1, maneuvered around the eastern slopes of Hill 382, and by enveloping action, destroyed two dug-in enemy tanks in the area. This enabled the troops to move into positions from which installations on the crest of 382 could be effectively re-engaged. At about 1530, Cos K and L, BLT 3/23, were altered, and soon thereafter moved to reinforce the lines of BLT 1 and BLT 2, respectively, for the night. Considerable difficulty was experienced by BLT 1 in closing the gap on the left with RCT 21. It was necessary to move two platoons of the reserve company into the gap under the cover of darkness in order to establish contact. In so doing, these elements were fired on by the Japs from a pocket that had been by-passed in RCT 21 zone during the day. Some casualties were incurred to troops of BLT 1. The average ground gained during the attack this date approximated 200 yards on the right and 300 yards on the left. The employment of the tanks of Co B, 4th Tk Bn, during the day was restricted because of difficulties of terrain, and heavy AT gunfire which could not be located. As a result of day's operations, the major resistance in the vicinity of HILL 382 and surrounding areas had been neutralized. However, enemy mortar concentrations registered on the hill proper prevented complete occupation of the high ground. Sniper fire in the area was reduced somewhat, but the movement of troops and vehicles in the open around the airfield still remained hazardous due to interdiction by enemy mortars. By 2300, contact with RCT 21 on the left had been gained and positions well established for night defense.