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On the night of 6 March the regiment received order for an attack to jump off at 0500 on 7 March thus taking advantage of about 1 hour of darkness. The 3d Bn 9th Mar, at the time attached to the 21st Marines, was to attack at the same hour in a southeasterly direction from a position on the left of the 2d Bn and seize HILL 362. The attack jumped off at 0500 7 March, preceded by smoke preparation. The attack apparently had its desired surprise effect and both battalions advanced up to 200 yards all along their fronts. By 0800 of the same day, however, the two assault companies of the 2d Bn and the left company of the 1st Bn were pinned down by fire from both the front and from by-passed positions to the rear. The 2d Bn companies, Co E and Co F suffered here their severest casualties of the campaign. About noon the enemy counterattacked in the 2d Bn sector accompanied by heavy mortar fired. The Res company of the 2d Bn with supporting tanks was moved into position and aided the assault companies in repulsing the attack. Assault platoons of Co F of the 2d Bn were pinned own by enemy fire for more than 30 hours and were finally removed from the position by tanks, who skillfully moved into the area and brought out the few remaining riflemen and company commander. Meanwhile during the day of 7 March, Co C of the 1st Bn attacked and seized some high ground on the right of the battalion sector. The enemy, however, soon placed effective heavy mortar fire on the hill and inflicted a loss of 44 out of the 54 attacking troops forcing them to abandon this position in the face of registered MG and Mort fire for one in defilade behind the hill.

The 3d Bn, during this day succeeded in capture of HILL 362, an important gain for the entire Corps.

During the last four days' action tanks of the 3d Tk Bn, 3d Mar Div were employed and proved to be the most formidable supporting weapon at our disposal. Their use was restricted by two features, namely terrain and well sighted heavy enemy anti-tank guns which disabled tanks in some instances with one well placed round. The former difficulty was overcome to some extent by bulldozing roads with tank dozers and an armored bulldozer; the latter difficulty by overrunning AT gun positions. AT mines were also a serious hazard which was difficult to overcome as enemy fire prevented mine removal. Special engineer and Inf teams and tank and Inf teams had to be improvised for the use of tanks due to no roads or mined roads. In the vicinity of the area under discussion an estimated 15 tanks were disabled. Nevertheless, tanks support was the deciding factor in this action as will be further verified below. With the seizure of HILL 362 on March 7 by the 3d Bn, the regiment was able to surround partially the enemy resistance which had been holding up any considerable advance for days. Resistance now remained in front of the 1st and 2d battalions and on the long ridge at 202-A,B,G,H.