21st Marines
C. 22 Feb. 4th Div Opn Order 3-45 was received at 0001 ordering
the Regt to relieve the 23d mar by 0730 and to continue the Atk at 0835.
The relief commenced under the cover of darkness with 1st and 2d Bns, 1st
Bn on the right. 2d Bn moved into position and effected the relief
by 0645 with little or no difficulty under the cover of darkness.
1st Bn received heavy enemy mortar and Arty fire during the early hours
of daylight causing many casualties while crossing the eastern part of
Airfield No 1. and it was doubtful that the 1st Bn would be able to effect
the relief and be in position to jump off on time. At 0755 1st Bn
was not in position and it was requested that 2d Bn 24th Mar (occupying
right ZofA) be Atchd in order to attack on schedule. At 0825 the
above request was cancelled since the Regt was prepared to attack on time.
The Atk to O-1 jumped off on schedule from a general line (181 S,T; 182
U; 165 A,B,C), preceded by an Arty and NGF preparation. The Atk progressed
slowly encountering a series of heavily fortified emplacements along the
entire front. Tanks, NGF and Arty were employed repeatedly with some
results. Progress of about 50 yards on the right and 250 yards on
the left was made during the entire day. However, many enemy emplacements
were reduced in Regtl ZofA. During the night the enemy placed Arty,
mortar and rockets and some small arms fire along the entire Regtl front.
23rd Marines
DOG PLUS THREE, 22 FEBRUARY, 1945
The main activity during the previous night consisted of breaking up
a counterattack of an estimated two hundred Japs in front of BLT 3/23 at
2330, principally by artillery fire. Thereafter, repeated attempts
at infiltration were repulsed. Sporadic but concentrated enemy artillery
and mortar fire persisted during the hours of darkness but were somewhat
reduced in volume in comparison with previous periods. Upon receipt
of a Division Warning Order, and later, at 0155, of division Operation
Order Number 3-45, the necessary plans and arrangements for the relief
of RCT 23 by RCT 21 were made with the officers of that unit. The
RCT 23 CP at 164 Y, NW corner, was organized as a joint CP operated by
the two organizations. Elements of Co C, 4th Tk Bn, passed to control
of RCT 21; 2/14 was assigned as direct support artillery. The necessary
guides from RCT 23 were furnished to expedite the relief prior to 0730.
Progress of the relief was slow due to heavy mortar and machine gun fire,
and the complete relief of all elements of RCT 23 was not effected until
approximately 1130, at which time BLT 2/24 was detached, reverting to control
of RCT 24 at 1200. RCT 23, when relieved, passed to VAC Reserve and
assembled in TAs 164 EY, 165 APUQLGH, and closed this area prior to 1300.
A reconnaissance of routes of approach to the zones of 4th and 5th Mar
Divs was made during the day in preparation for possible commitment in
these areas. Elements of the RCT reorganized and partially reequipped
from material salvaged in the rear areas. The RCT CP remained at
164 Y, NW, and intermittent shelling of this and other portions of the
RCT area continued throughout the day.
24th Marines
22 February, 1945
Enemy mortar and artillery fire were received from 0001 until dawn.
An enemy plane dropped two 63 KG bombs in vicinity of RCT 24 CP at approximately
0230. One bomb was a dud but the other exploded causing one casualty.
RCT 23 was relieved by RCT 21. At this time BLT 2/24 reverted to
RCT 24 control and was ordered to move into an assembly area in the vicinity
of TA 165 E, 166 A. BLT 1/24 remained attached to RCT 25. RCT
24 (less BLT 1/24) remained in Division Reserve. King hour was at
0830. The 3d Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company and 2d Sec, 7th
War Dog Platoon landed at 0815 on Beach YELLOW 1. BLT 2/24 arrived
in its assigned assembly area at 1230. At 1101 RCT 25 reported a
possible enemy counterattack forming in the vicinity of TA 184 UVW, 183
AB and orders were received by RCT 24 to make disposition of its units
so as to support RCT 25 if a counterattack should develop. RCT 24
coordinated this support with RCT 25. All units of RCT 24 were alerted
and prepared to support RCT 25 from defensive positions in the vicinity
of their assembly areas. RCT 24 received a warning order at 1617
to be prepared to take over the zone of action of RCT 25 on short notice
during the night. Orders to consolidate at 1800 were received and
complied with. During the daylight hours and until 2400 very little
enemy fire was received.
25th Marines
D plus 3, 22 February 1945.
Accurate enemy mortar and artillery fire for short but intense periods
was received throughout the night. Enemy patrols constantly harassed
the front lines and attempted to infiltrate through the line. The
enemy patrols were repulsed, though some casualties were suffered as a
result of their activity.
Div Op Or No. 3-45 was received during the night and called for the
continuation of the attack at K-hour (0830) to seize O-2. RCT-21
was to pass through RCT-23 on the left prior to K-hour. The plan
of RCT-25 with 1/24 and Co A & B, 4th Tank Bn attached was for the
initial effort to be made on the left. BLT-1/25 on the left, was
ordered to attack straight to the north to the RCT left boundary where
it would hold its position and be pinched out as RCT 21 advanced across
its front. When this was completed a coordinated attack of the whole
front line would begin to seize O-1. Due to the delay of RCT 21 on
the left in effecting relief of RCT 23 the attack did not jump off until
1215. Initially the attack progressed well against moderate resistance
and gains of up to 200 yards were made on the extreme left. However,
RCT-21 suddenly fell back to its original position leaving the left of
RCT-25 completely exposed. Since RCT 25 had only a small reserve
it was necessary for BLT 1/25 to drop back to its original position to
prevent a very large gap. BLT 3/25 made only minor local improvements
in positions during the day, however fired two rocket barrages on the hill
in TA 183 C D to soften the position. This barrage drove a large
number of enemy out of their emplacements who were immediately taken under
fire by well placed MGs. It was estimated that 200 of the enemy were
killed in this manner. BLT 2/25 in the right center was counter?attacked
at 1120 by an estimated 100 enemy following a very heavy enemy mortar
barrage. The attack was repulsed, however, a large number of casualties
were received from the enemy mortar fire. BLT 1/24 on the right,
made only local improvements in its positions. At 1000 a hard cold
rain began to fall and continued throughout the day., At 1530, the
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. J. M. Chambers and the Air Ln Officer of BLT 3/25
were wounded by enemy MG fire while in the BLT OP. Captain James
G. Headley, formerly C.O. of Co L, but serving as Bn X, was ordered to
assume command of LT 3/25. Units were ordered to consolidate positions
at 1630, however, a gap on the left existed and, although the Res Co of
BLT 1/25 was employed, was not filled completely. At
1830, a large group of enemy was observed forming up in front of BLT-2/25
and moving toward our front lines. This attempted counterattack
was broken up and repulsed by BLT 2/25.
26th Marines
D+3, 22 Feb 45 Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
27th Marines
D plus 3 22 February, 1945
Our beach defense units reported an attempted counter-landing in T.S.
180J by an estimated 50 men and another in T.S. 180O by an estimated 400
men during the night. These landing attempts were repulsed by our
beach defense units and naval gunfire.
28th Marines
D+3
1800, 21 February to 1800 22 February.
Night Activity: Sporadic mortar and artillery fire landed in our
area through the night. The Japs again sent up flares from SURIBACHI.
At 2335, three enemy swimmers were killed attempting to come ashore
on the west beach.
An attempted dawn infiltration was made against LT-228 and LT-328
but was unsuccessful.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 continued the attack at 0835 with three
landing teams abreast; boundaries and objectives remained the same.
By 1015, LT-228 on the east and LT-128 on the west were moving around the
base of the mountain.
Lt. Comdr Mc Carthy, Regimental Surgeon, was killed in the CP
by a mortar burst about 0800.
Bad weather and poor visibility throughout the day hampered our
operations considerably. The rain mixed with volcanic dust caused
stoppages in practically all automatic weapons, reducing them to single
shot weapons.
Units were ordered to consolidate at 1630.
Casualties for period Supporting units for the period
KIA & DOW
1 33 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 LC(S).
Combat efficiency: 70%
CT 26, with 5thTankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak
and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT
126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective
on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front
lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed
passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding
elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of
4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for
similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement
while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in
advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the
center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff
line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action
of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv.
No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date.
All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire
and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions
in the bluff. Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to
the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful
due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940
the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed.
The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan
was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at
about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser
extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire.
At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable
ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements
organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which
attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT
boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during
the day from the 4thMarDiv).
Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However
replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided
immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable
roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties:
5 Off, 95 Enl.
Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
The enemy attempted no offensive action during the morning, but shelled
our positions with mortar and artillery fire.
This combat team became division reserve at 1300 on this date when
passage of lines was competed.
The enemy dead reported to date was 515.
Off. Enl.
WIA
4 60 3d Bn, 13th Marines,
SK (evac)
8 C Co, 5th Tank Bn.
TOTAL
5 101